SPECIAL MEETING
City Hall
80 Broad Street
December 19, 2019
5:00 p.m.

CITY COUNCIL

A. Roll Call

B. Invocation – Councilmember White

C. Pledge of Allegiance

D. Bills up for Third Reading:

1. An ordinance to amend Chapter 54 of the Code of the City of Charleston (Zoning Ordinance) to eliminate the requirement in Section 54-943(c) thereof for a three-fourths vote of all members of the City Council to adopt a proposed amendment, supplement, or change to the Zoning Ordinance or Zoning Map when the Planning Commission disapproves such amendment, supplement, or change or when a protest is presented. (Requested by Councilmember Perry K. Waring)

F. Miscellaneous Business:

1. The inaugural meeting of City Council will be Monday, January 13, 2020 at 12:00 p.m. at City Hall, 80 Broad Street.

2. The next regular meeting of City Council will be Tuesday, January 14, 2020 at 5:00 p.m. at City Hall, 80 Broad Street.

In accordance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, people who need alternative formats, ASL (American Sign Language) Interpretation or other accommodation please contact Janet Schumacher at (843) 577-1388 or email to schumachert@charleston-sc.gov three business days prior to the meeting.
AN ORDINANCE

TO AMEND CHAPTER 54 OF THE CODE OF THE CITY OF CHARLESTON (ZONING ORDINANCE) TO ELIMINATE THE REQUIREMENT IN SECTION 54-943(c) THEREOF FOR A THREE-FOURTHS VOTE OF ALL MEMBERS OF THE CITY COUNCIL TO ADOPT A PROPOSED AMENDMENT, SUPPLEMENT, OR CHANGE TO THE ZONING ORDINANCE OR ZONING MAP WHEN THE PLANNING COMMISSION DISAPPROVES SUCH AMENDMENT, SUPPLEMENT, OR CHANGE OR WHEN A PROTEST IS PRESENTED.

BE IT ORDAINED BY THE MAYOR AND COUNCILMEMBERS OF CHARLESTON, IN CITY COUNCIL ASSEMBLED:

Section 1. City Council makes the following findings:

(a) Section 54-943(c) of the Code of the City of Charleston presently provides that, if the Planning Commission recommends disapproval of an amendment, supplement, or change to the City’s Zoning Ordinance or Zoning Map, or if twenty percent (20%) or more of certain property owners in or near the area to be subject to the proposed amendment, supplement, or change present a proper protest, that City Council may not adopt the amendment, supplement, or change, except upon the favorable vote of three-fourths (3/4) of all members of City Council.

(b) City Council requested an opinion from the Attorney General for the State of South Carolina (the “Attorney General”) on the proper procedure for amending section 54-943(c) to eliminate or reduce the requirement that a “supermajority” of City Council vote favorably to adopt a proposed amendment, supplement, or change under the circumstances set forth in section 54-943(c).

(c) On October 8, 2019, the Attorney General opined that, pursuant to section 5-7-250 of the South Carolina Code, a municipality may adopt such a supermajority requirement, but that such a procedure is not required. A copy of the Attorney General’s opinion in this regard is attached hereto as Exhibit 1.

(d) The Attorney General also opined that “a municipality that adopts a supermajority requirement to amend a zoning ordinance such as [the City Council of Charleston] did here is not required to remove such a requirement by the vote of a supermajority.” As a result, the Attorney General concluded: “[W]e believe if City Council enacted section 54-943 by a
majority vote, a court would similarly find the City Council can change or amend it by a majority vote.”

(e) In accordance with the Attorney General’s opinion, City Council intends to amend the procedures for adopting proposed amendments, supplements, or changes to the Zoning Ordinance and Zoning Map, as set forth in Section 54-943 of the Zoning Ordinance, to eliminate the requirement that three-fourths of City Council vote favorably to adopt such amendments, supplements, or changes when the Planning Commission recommends disapproval or when a protest is presented as presently set forth in Section 54-943(c).

(f) In adopting this Ordinance, City Council intends that that the quorum and voting requirements generally applicable to City Council, as set forth in Chapter 2 of the Code of the City of Charleston, apply. City Council also intends that all other procedural requirements applicable to the adoption, amendment, supplement, modification, repeal, or change of the Zoning Ordinance or the Zoning Map shall remain in effect.

Section 2. Section 54-943(c) of the Code of the City of Charleston (Zoning Ordinance) is hereby deleted, and Sections 54-943(d) through (f) of the Code of the City of Charleston (Zoning Ordinance) are hereby re-alphabetized accordingly.

Section 3. This ordinance shall become effective upon ratification.

Ratified in City Council this ___ day of __________ in the year of Our Lord, 2019, in the ___ Year of the Independence of the United States of America.

By: ____________________________
    John J. Tecklenburg, Mayor
    City of Charleston

ATTEST: By: ____________________________
          Vanessa Turner Maybank
          Clerk of Council
EXHIBIT 1

October 8, 2019

Daniel S. McQueeny, Jr., Esq.
Assistant Corporation Counsel
City of Charleston
50 Broad Street
Charleston, South Carolina 29401

Dear Mr. McQueeny:

We received your letter addressed to Attorney General Alan Wilson requesting an opinion of this Office regarding the City of Charleston’s Zoning Ordinance (CZO). You stated the CZO “governs the procedure for amending the City’s zoning regulations or maps.” On behalf of the Charleston City Council (City Council), you ask us to point you to “any authority supporting the proposition that City Council must follow the procedure outlined in section 54-943.c to amend the requirement in section 54-943.c that ‘a favorable vote of three-fourths (3/4) of all members of the City Council’ is required when the City’s Planning Commission recommends disapproval of the amendment.”

Law/Analysis

You explained as part of the CZO, City Council adopted section 54-943, which provides procedures for changes or amendments to zoning regulations, restrictions, and boundaries. Section 54-943.a allows City Council on its own or by petition of a specified group of property owners to initiate a change or amendment to the CZO. This provision states:

The City Council may from time to time on its own initiative or on petition, signed by a majority of the property owners according to the frontage in any district or portion thereof as large as one city block between two intersecting streets, amend, supplement or change the regulations, restrictions or the district boundaries herein established or subsequently established. This shall be done only after reference to and report by the Planning Commission; and after public hearing by City Council, official notice of the time and place of which shall be given in a newspaper of general circulation in the city at least fifteen (15) days prior to such hearing, except in the case of adoption or amendment of land development regulations in which case official notice of
the time and place of the public hearing before City Council shall be given in a newspaper of general circulation in the city at least thirty (30) days prior to such hearing.

Charleston, S.C., Code § 54-943.a (2019). Section 54-943.c sets forth the procedure for amending or changing the CZO should the Planning Commission disapprove the amendment, supplement, or change or if a property owner protests such a change or an amendment. This provision states:

In case the proposed amendment, supplement or change be disapproved by the Planning Commission, or a protest be presented duly signed and acknowledged by the owners of twenty percent or more either of the area of the lots included in such change, or of those immediately adjacent in the rear and on the side or sides thereof or of those directly opposite thereto, such amendment, supplement or change shall not become effective except by the favorable vote of three-fourths (¾) of all members of the City Council.

(emphasis added).

We understand from your letter, City Council desires an opinion on the procedure to amend section 54-943 and specifically, whether a three-fourths majority vote is required. Section 54-943 does not specifically state it applies to amendments to this provision. Thus, we must employ the rules of statutory interpretation. Just as a statute, “[w]hen interpreting an ordinance, the legislative intent must prevail if it can be reasonably discovered in the language used.” Mikeill v. City of Charleston, 386 S.C. 153, 160, 687 S.E.2d 326, 330 (2009). “The legislature’s intent should be ascertained primarily from the plain language of the statute. The language must also be read in a sense which harmonizes with its subject matter and accords with its general purpose.” Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. S.C. Second Injury Fund, 363 S.C. 612, 622, 611 S.E.2d 297, 301–02 (Ct. App. 2005) (citations omitted).

Section 6-7-10 of the South Carolina Code (2004) states the purposes of zoning is

to enable municipalities and counties acting individually or in concert to preserve and enhance their present advantages, to overcome their present handicaps, and to prevent or minimize such future problems as may be foreseen. To accomplish this intent local governments are encouraged to plan for future development; to prepare, adopt, and from time to time revise, a comprehensive plan to guide future local development; and to participate in a regional planning organization to coordinate local planning and development with that of the surrounding region. As aids in the implementation of the comprehensive plan local governments are encouraged to adopt and enforce appropriate land use controls, and cooperate with other governmental authorities.
The provisions of this chapter are declared to be necessary for the promotion, protection, and improvement of the public health, safety, comfort, good order, appearance, convenience, prosperity, morals, and general welfare. Any county or municipality may, but shall not be required to, exercise any of the powers granted by this chapter. Whenever such a governing authority shall elect to exercise any of the powers granted by this chapter, such powers shall be exercised in the manner hereinafter prescribed.

Reading section 54-943 as whole in concert with the other provisions in the CZO and the purpose of zoning as provided by the Legislature, we believe it pertains to amendments and changes to the zoning map rather than amendments and changes to section 54-943. Section 54-943.a provides a method to “amend, supplement or change the regulations, restrictions or the district boundaries herein established or subsequently established.” This provision indicates the amendments and changes relate to the actual use and location of the property, not a change in the procedures governing such restrictions and regulations.

We believe this reading of section 54-943 is constant with the authority granted to municipalities by the Legislature. Section 5-7-250 of the South Carolina Code (2004) provides that municipal councils determine their own rules. In addition, section 5-7-160 of the South Carolina Code (2004) states:

All powers of the municipality are vested in the council, except as otherwise provided by law, and the council shall provide for the exercise thereof and for the performance of all duties and obligations imposed on the municipality by law.

A majority of the total membership of the council shall constitute a quorum for the purpose of transacting council business.

Thus, unless the Legislature provided otherwise, municipal councils are free to conduct municipal business how they see fit.


An act, ordinance, or rule, once adopted, is not necessarily binding upon future legislative bodies, which bodies are free to amend or modify previous
actions taken. See Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 50 L.Ed.2d 274 (1905); Op. Atty. gen. dated March 31, 1988. This is particularly true where, as here, such requirement relates to a time limit established by a prior council regarding submission of an item to future councils. In Manigault, a statute required the South Carolina legislature to follow certain procedures, including the necessity of a petition, prior to enacting private legislation. A subsequent legislature refused to follow the statutory procedure in enacting such legislation. The Supreme Court deemed the statutory procedure as having been amended by a subsequent legislature. The Court concluded:

This law was doubtless intended as a guide to persons desiring to petition the legislature for special privileges, and it would be a good answer to any petition for the granting of such privileges that the required notice had not been given; but it is not binding upon any subsequent legislature, nor does the noncompliance with it impair or nullify the provisions of an act passed without the requirement of such notice. (Emphasis added.)

199 U.S. at 487.

Id. Accordingly, not only are municipalities free to conduct business as they see fit, but they are also not bound by acts of prior councils.

Moreover, we did not find any state law requiring a three-fourths majority vote to change or amend the CZO. The Local Government Comprehensive Planning Enabling Act of 1994 is contained in chapter 29 of title 6. Section 6-29-760 of the South Carolina Code (2004), included in this act, governs the procedures for the enactment or amendment of zoning regulations or maps. In our review of this provision, we did not find a requirement that any such amendments be made by three-fourths or any other specified majority of the governing authority. Accordingly, we do not find a legislative mandate that amendments to zoning ordinances must be by a three-fourths majority of a city council. Pursuant to section 5-7-250, cited above, a municipality could adopt such a requirement, but we do not believe it is required.

Furthermore, we believe a municipality that adopts a super majority requirement to amend a zoning ordinance, as City Council did here, is not required to remove such a requirement by the vote of a super majority. As we explained in a 2012 opinion:

The general rule was stated by the Court in Wright v. City of Florence, 229 S.C. 419, 93 S.E.2d 215 (1956), citing 6 McQuillan Municipal Corporations, § 21.10 as follows:
Specific grant of power to repeal ordinances, however, ordinarily is not necessary since it is the general rule that power to enact ordinances implies power, unless otherwise provided in the grant, to repeal them. It is patently obvious that the effectiveness of any legislative body would be entirely destroyed if the power to amend or repeal its legislative acts were taken away from it.’ The following is also quoted from the cited section of McQuillan: ‘The power of repeal extends, generally speaking, to all ordinances. Indeed, a municipal corporation cannot abridge its own legislative powers by the passage of irrevocable ordinances. The members of its legislative body are trustees for the public, and the nature and limited tenure of their office impress the ordinances enacted by them with liability to change. One council may not by an ordinance bind itself or its successors so as to prevent free legislation in matters of municipal government. Accordingly, in the absence of a valid provision to the contrary, a municipal council or assembly, having the power to legislate on, or exercise discretionary or regulatory authority over, any given subject may exercise that power at will by enacting or repealing an ordinance in relation to the subject ... 


City Council’s power to enact section 54-943 also entails the power to repeal, or in this case amend, it. Presumably, City Council enacted 54-943 via a simple majority vote. As such, we are of the opinion City Council would not be precluded from amending section 56-943 by the vote of a simple majority.

In our research, we did not find South Carolina case law specifically addressing the whether a super-majority vote is required to amend an act of legislative body imposing a super-majority vote requirement. However, other jurisdictions addressing this issue found such provisions may be repealed or amended by the same authority required to enact them. The Appellate Court of Illinois considered whether a city council rule requiring a two-thirds vote of the city council to change a city council rule could be changed by a the vote of a simple majority of the city council. Roti v. Washington, 500 N.E.2d 463 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986). The court considered other jurisdictions addressing this issue.

In State ex rel. Kiel v. Riechmann (1911), 239 Mo. 81, 142 S.W. 304, the defendants, members of the Republican City Committee of the City of St. Louis, voted to change certain committee rules in the middle of its officers’ term of office. Rule 1 stated that no officer could be removed without the vote
of 18 committee members; rule 15 provided that the rules could not be
"repealed or altered unless by a three-fourths majority vote of all the members
* * *." (142 S.W. 304, 305-06.) A committee member proposed a resolution
to amend rule 15 to require only a majority vote to amend the rules. The
committee members voted 14 to 12 in favor of the motion, and by the same
vote they amended rule 1 to require only a majority vote to change the
committee’s officers. The court addressed the question:

"[D]oes a rule requiring a three-fourths vote to change the rules
prevent a majority vote from changing that rule? Can a majority vote
restrict its own power by such a rule, so that after such restriction the
majority loses its potentiality? * * * [T]he power to make carries with
it the right and power to unmake. The same power which can make
rules in the first instance can directly attack and unmake or repeal such
rules. * * * [I]f by a bare majority rules are adopted, and among them
is a rule saying that no change shall be made therein, except upon a
three fourths vote of the members, then in such case, before the
majority could proceed to enact new rules, it must first directly attack
this rule which limited the power of the bare majority.”

(142 S.W. 304, 309.) Similarly, the supreme courts of New Hampshire,
Pennsylvania and Maryland have held that if the majority of a public body can
make a rule imposing a supermajority requirement for the alteration of rules, a
majority may also amend that rule. (Richardson, 58 N.H. 187;
Commonwealth v. Mayor of Lancaster (Penn.1836), 5 Watts 152, 155 56:
Zeiler v. Central Ry. Co. (Md.1896), 84 Md. 304, 35 A. 932.) Plaintiffs have
cited no case which holds that an assembly’s rule imposing a supermajority
requirement for various actions may not itself be changed by the vote of a
simple majority.

Id. at 467-68. The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed the trial court’s decision that a simple
majority of the city council had the power to amend the rule requiring a super majority vote. Id.

Other jurisdictions made similar determinations. See Roosevelt v. City of Englewood, 492 P.2d
65, 67 (Colo. 1971) (recognizing a municipality’s ability to amend an ordinance calling for a
three-fourth’s majority by a simple majority); S. Nevada Homebuilders Ass’n v. Clark Cty., 117
P.3d 171 (2005) (holding a “county zoning ordinance’s supermajority approval requirement for
nonconforming zone change applications violated its enabling statute and, thus, was invalid.”);
“city ordinance requiring approval of protested zoning changes by three-fourths of the city
council was superseded by city’s amended charter, which recognized zoning authority and
provided for adoption of new ordinances by simple majority.”).
We are not positive our courts would come to the same conclusion as the jurisdictions referenced above. However, our courts recognize that along with the power to enact comes the power to repeal. As such, we believe if City Council enacted section 54-943 by a majority vote, a court would similarly find the City Council can change or amend it by a majority vote.

Conclusion

Reading the CZO as a whole and in light of its intended purpose, we are of the opinion that section 54-943.c does not impose a three-fourths majority voting requirement for amendments to section 54-943. In addition, we believe this interpretation is in accordance with the authority given to municipal councils by the Legislature and prior opinions of this Office finding if a municipality has the power to enact an ordinance, it also has the implied power to repeal such an ordinance and is not bound by the acts of prior councils.

Sincerely,

Cydney Milling
Assistant Attorney General

REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY:

Robert D. Cook
Solicitor General